German Tanks in World War II

The success curve of the German tanks was the exact inverse of the weight curve of the individual vehicles. The victories in Poland and France were achieved mainly by light tanks (Panzer I and Panzer II), which made up more than three quarters of the total number of tanks. After 1942, while defeats were piling up, heavy tanks came up, with the Tiger in the summer of 1942 and the Panther in the spring of 1943. In 1944, when the defeat is all but certain, record heavy tanks such as the Kingtiger and the Jagdtiger appeared on the battlefield.

The explanation is double. The first is internal: in 1939-40, the enemies of Germany had only bad weapons. Tanks too light or poorly adapted and above all, poorly employed. The antitank equipment is still worse. Five years later, the picture has changed. Allied tanks poured out of the factories by the tens of thousand, five or six for each German tank produced. The superiority was not confined to tanks, but extended to all compartments of the battlefield. The second reason is internal. The industrial mobilization of Germany began in earnest only in 1943. Between the first full year of the war (1940) and the last one (1944), the production of medium and heavy tanks is multiply by more than ten (from 1359 to 17 318). It is too little but above all too late. Germany had no chance to win a long-drawn war. By starting its effort too late, Germany could only delayed the end of the horror, without any chance to win. Hitler claimed to win the war through the "Triumph of the Will"(*), but he lacked will when it could have made a difference. Megalomania and incompetence of a dictator.

The German light tanks dated back from before the war. The Panzer I was designed as a training vehicle and ordered before the nazis came to power. The Panzer II had been launched only to fill the gap caused by the delays in the medium tank programs. At the onset of the war, both models were outclassed (the Spanish Civil War had proved that). Yet, those tanks achieved the German successes against adversaries nominally more powerful than themselves (such as the Polish 7TP or the French B1 Bis) but poorly employed (dispersed over the whole battlefield instead of being regrouped at essential locations).

Despite attempts to upgrade them, further production of either the Panzer I nor the Panzer II was not justified by their value in combat. It took until 1942 before their production ended (not entirely though, since some derivatives of the Panzer II were still built in 1944).

Those machines will bear the brunt of the combats. Heavy tanks were more spectacular, but they were not numerous enough. The workhorse of the German Panzerwaffe at the start of the war is neither the Panzer III nor the Panzer IV, but the Czech tanks. The Panzer 35 (t) and the Panzer 38 (t) represented a quarter of the total strength in tanks in 1940-41. Although their armament and armor were a bit too light, they made up that failing by their extraordinary mechanical reliability. Long after they were removed from the frontline (in the end of 1941), their chassis went on being used to mount a variety of weapon systems.

In 1939, the Panzer III had an antitank function. The Panzer IV, heavier and more expensive, had rather an antipersonnel role. Their weaponry reflected that repartition of tasks: the Panzer III had a shells with a high muzzle velocity, whereas the Panzer IV had heavier projectiles. The scenario was played along the book until the T-34 came up. For more than a year, the Germans had to fight with an antitank tank of which the gun could not pierce the armor of its main enemy. The successive lengthening of the gun (50 mm L/42 then L/60) could not solve the problem. Finally, the Panzer III resigned its antitank claims and took over the antipersonnel gun of the Panzer IV (model N).

The Panzer IV exchanged its short 75 mm gun for a longer one, with a higher muzzle velocity. Luckily for the Germans, the chassis of the Panzer IV proved perfectly adaptable to the successive increases in weight that the war imposed. Its weight increased by a third from the model D (the first mass-produced), engaged in the campaign in France and the version J, the last model, produced until the end. The maximum armor went from 35 to 80 mm !

At the end of the war, the Panzer IV was still the standard tank of the German Panzerdivisions.

The most spectacular and the first to appear was the Tiger. It was new, since it doubled in a swoop the weight of a tank, without loosing its mobility (as it had been the case with the previous attempts at producing a heavy tank). Its armor and above all its gun (88 mm) put it ahead of any of its adversaries. That insolent superiority was kept until almost the end of the war. Only the emergence of the Iosip Stalin in the East, and the Pershing in the West will redress the qualitative balance.

The German aim to produce tanks worth four or five enemies could have been successful with the first Tiger. But with less than 1500 produced, even that winning system would not have been enough. The next model of Tiger, the Kingtiger, was issued in August 1944, two years after the original. It quite simply pushed further the weight inflation. The gun was more powerful (88 mm L/71), the armor thicker but the mobility was gone. As to the numbers, less than 500 were produced !

Both models of the Tiger had a common wrong that defeated the equation of five to one: the mechanical fragility. On those monsters, the breakdowns were rife. To inflict oneself damages, the enemy became superfluous. Losses due to breakdowns happened already during the first intervention of the Tiger and went further, exacting a high percentage of the total losses until the end of the war.

The Panther too had reliability problems, but it can compete for the title of best tank of the war, though. A quarter lighter than the first Tiger, not so well-protected on its sides, it enjoyed an excellent front protection and against tanks its gun was only marginally less powerful than the 88 mm of the Tiger. But above all, it was fast. At parity with the T-34, although it was heavier by a third and much more than the half so heavy Panzer IV ! Its suspension system made of it an excellent fire platform. The Panther was probably the best candidate for the successful five to one equation. With 5000 units produced, it could compensate only a fraction of the allied superiority though.

The Germans invented the assault gun (German translation: Sturmgeschütz). By grouping their tanks in panzerdivisions, they deprived their infantry of the support necessary for its progression. So they created a gun mounted on an armored chassis, without turret, to take over that supporting role. The first Sturmgeschütz were successfully experimented during the campaign in France. Their cost was lower than a real tank and they could carry a heavier gun than the equivalent tank.

At the same time, appeared the tank destroyer (in German Panzerjäger). Once more, the grouping of tanks left the infantry without effective antitank weapons. The classical antitank guns lacked mobility (and power). So the idea to mount an antitank gun on the chassis of a tank. The first attempt was modest: an Czech 47 mm antitank gun on the chassis of a Panzer I.

The two types of vehicles evolved in their own direction until the crisis of the T-34 (and the KV). Those new enemies could withstand any tank of antitank German guns. The development of a new tank to counter the threat would take time. An immediate solution was required. Actually, they were two: the assault guns saw their role extended to the antitank struggle and a new generation of tank destroyers came up.

The new assault gun was the model F of the Sturmgeschütz III (quickly followed by the model G). The short 75 mm gun was replaced by a longer one with a higher muzzle velocity and able to pierce the armor of the feared T-34 (and the KV's). Under that new form, the assault gun will last until the end of the war. The disadvantage it incurred was the need to aim the gun with the tracks (without turret, its main weapon had only limited traverse). It was amply compensated by the low cost, the powerful gun and the added protection provided by its low silhouette. While the production of Panzer III stopped in August 1943, its chassis was produced until the end of the war to convert them in Sturmgeschütz.

The tank destroyer had a low key start. To counter the armored threat, every chassis at had are used to mount the available antitank guns. It gave the motley array of Marder. Almost 3000 were built on six different chassis (of which three are of French origin), with two sort of guns (of which one is of Russian origin). It gave in total eight sub-variants of Marder. Furthermore, a heavy tank-destroyer came up with the Nashorn (Rhino). A super 88 mm L/71 gun mounted on the chassis of a Panzer IV. Very powerful but highly vulnerable. Makeshift job once more.

The evolution continued though. From the makeshift tank destroyer (Panzerjäger) to the more elaborate hunting tank (Jagdpanzer). The Elefant, a 88 mm L/71 gun on the chassis of a Tiger, is the first one. In contrast to the assault gun, it is specialized in the antitank struggle. In contrast to the first generation of panzerjäger, it is no more an aftermath fix but a development starting at design stage.

The first model was the Jagdpanzer IV, a transitional type (it was also called Panzerjäger 39). It was not so different from the Sturmgeschütz IV, which shared the same gun. The following Jagdpanzer IV/70, with the gun of the Panther, was as real hunting tank. The concept is then extended to the chassis of heavy tanks. From the Panther derived the Jagdpanther with the same 88 mm as on the Kingtiger. The evolution reached its logical climax when the Jagdtiger appeared on the chassis of a Kingtiger, with a huge 12.8 cm gun in a casemate, the biggest gun of the war. Once more, a monster had emerged from the German drawing boards. It is too heavy and too fragile. On the battlefield, what the enemy tanks could not achieved, breakdowns did: put out of actions the monsters produced by a dying industry.

For another weapon system, the Germans were trailblazers: the self-propelled guns. Unlike assault guns, they are not intended for direct support of the infantry. They retained the traditional role of the artillery, operating with indirect fire coming from far inside the friendly lines. Compared to the traditional tractor drawn artillery, they move much faster, can cross any ground and the preparation for fire is shortened, features of high importance in the frame of fast armored operations.

The first attempts, the Bison, are more or less failures. The 15 cm infantry howitzer is too heavy and overload the chassis of the Panzer I, Panzer II and the Czech tank 38. The Sturmgeschütz 33 on the chassis of a Panzer III is only marginally better. Only the Bison model M, on the modified chassis of a Czech tank 38, had a longer production line.

The next attempt was more successful: field howitzer are installed on the hulls of Panzer II (Wespe) and on a mix of Panzer III/IV (Hummel). Those two models will remain in service until the end of the war.